Poder dominante nas plataformas digitais e self-prefrencing: uma análise do caso Google Shopping à luz do direito administrativo concorrencial sancionador

Abstract

This undergraduate thesis aims to analyze the practice of self-preferencing in digital markets from the perspective of Administrative Competition Law and Sanctioning Enforcement, focusing on the Google Shopping Case as examined in different jurisdictions. The study begins by recognizing that technological innovation and the ongoing digitalization of the economy have deeply reshaped market relations and challenged the traditional legal instruments for competition protection. Digital platforms, by assuming a central role in the intermediation of economic and informational flows, have acquired unprecedented market power, derived from network effects, massive data collection, and algorithmic control over visibility and consumer behavior. The research addresses the central question of defining the legal boundaries between legitimate vertical integration strategies and potentially abusive self-preferencing practices when carried out by dominant undertakings. The hypothesis assumes that although self-preferencing may generate efficiencies and consumer benefits, its exercise by companies controlling essential digital infrastructures can constitute an abuse of dominance, particularly when it results in market foreclosure and reduction of competitive rivalry. The general objective is to assess how Administrative Competition Law can effectively address the challenges imposed by platform-based markets. The specific objectives include the conceptual analysis of market power and abuse of dominance, the characterization of network effects and digital ecosystems, and the comparative assessment of the Google Shopping Case in Brazil and the European Union. The findings reveal that the Brazilian enforcement model, represented by CADE, still operates under a predominantly consequentialist approach, requiring empirical evidence of consumer harm, while the European model adopts a more structural and preventive rationale. This divergence reflects contrasting conceptions of competition policy, one focused on efficiency and innovation, and the other on preserving market structure and fairness.